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ABSTRACT
This paper explores links between policy uncertainty and
growth. It provides evidence on the correlation between policy
uncertainty and per capita real GD? for 46 developing countries
over the 1970-85 period. Cross-section regressions on growth
suggest that after accounting for standard variables from the
endogenous growth literature, policy uncertainty and growth are
correlated. The importance of the correlation and even its sign
depend on the particular policy and on the geographical region
examined.
One channel through which policy uncertainty may affect
growth is the investment channel. Using an endogenous growth
model where domestic investment is characterized by
irreversibilities and policy fluctuates between a high and low-
tax regime, we show that the gap between the two regimes and the
persistence of a regime jointly determine the pattern of
investment and growth. Policy uncertainty in the absence of
persistence does not affect long run growth.
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and NBER and NBERI. Introduction
Since1970, many developing countries have experienced disappointing
rates of growth in percapita output.Figure 1 shows some growth rates over the
1970-85 period and compares them to an earlier period. The figure drives home
the point that growth rates have declined except in Asia.
In order to improve the climate for private investment and growth, a
number of countries have made the difficult choice to adopt more appropriate
macroeconomic and structural policies. Yet these policies have often failed to
elicit the desired response. Capital flight continues to be a problem, assets from
past capital flight get reinvested abroad, and external sources of financing private
investment projects remain elusive. The new wisdom is that it may not be enough
to set macroeconomic policies at the "right' levels. Uncertainty about the future
course of policies should also be minimized.
In the standard neoclassical growth model, policy uncertainty plays no role
in determining the long-run growth rate of percapita output.Policy shocks
displace the economy only temporarily from its original growth path. In
contrast, models of endogenous growth suggest that policies and policy
disturbances can have permanent effects on growth.
The purpose of this paper is to explore links between policy uncertainty
and growth. Section II motivates the story by providing evidence on the
correlations between policy uncertainty measures and growth rates for 46
developing countries. The data show that the degree of policy uncertainty as
well as its correlation with growth differ markedly across regions and across
policies. We also present cross-section regressions for average growth rates of

























































































































































other standard variables from the endogenous growth literature as well as policy
uncertainty measures. While the regressions have no structural interpretation,
they are a useful way of summarizing correlations in the data. They suggest that
after taking into account other factors, policy uncertainty is still highly correlated
with growth in many instances. While the correlation is typically negative, there
are cases where the correlation is positive or nonexistent.
In Section III, we explore theoretically one way policy uncertainty might
affect long-run growth1 namely by altering the pattern of investment. We
consider a simple scenario where investors bear all the consequences of
uncertainty. They may invest in a domestic project whose return depends upon
the realization of a particular government policy or they may invest abroad in a
risk-free asset. The domestic project is characterized by irreversibilities and
policy can fluctuate between a high-tax and low-tax state. In this set up, if policy
fluctuates randomly between the two states, increasing the amount of policy
uncertainty has noeffecton the pattern of investment in the absence of policy
persistence. But if policy is characterized by persistence, then higher policy
uncertainty alters the expected net present value of the marginal product of
capital and hence the pattern of investment. Moreover, with investment in human
capital linked to investment in physical capital, policy uncertainty and persistence
jointly determine the growth rate. Since there is evidence that macrn policies are
highly persistent, we should expect to find correlations between policy
uncertainty measures and growth in the data.
Clearly, policy uncertainty might influence growth in many ways. The
importance of these various channels, including the investment channel, will
require future empirical work.3
II. The Evidence
Table 1 displays simple correlations between growth rates inper capita real
GDP and the unexpected or surprise component of selected policies for 46
developing countries. The table shows a negative correlation between various
measures of policy uncertainty and growth.
Some explanation about the construction of the table is in order. The
growth rate is the estimated coefficient on time taken from a regression of the log
of per capita real GDP on a constant and a time trend. As pointed outby
Gregorio (1991) and others, this procedure gives some weight to all yearly
observations, not just to the extremes. The GDP data are taken from the
Summers-Heston (1988) international comparison project. Theunexpected
component of policy was calculated by fitting a first-order autoregressive process
of the form:
(1) (Policy =13o +131 (PoIicy)ti + Ct,
where f3i is the autoregressive parameter. With only 15years of annual data, no
attempt was made to test for more complicated autoregressive schemes. The
unexpected component of policy was taken to be the standard deviation of the
residual. Data on policies were taken from the IMF's International Financial
Statistics tape, the World Bank study on public andprivate investment shams
(Pferrermann and Madarassy,1991), and the Surnmers-Heston project.1
Asecondmeasure of policyuncertainty was also calculated, namely the unexpected deviation
from wend policy. Thismeasure was obtained byestimating:3a
TABLE I










Data Sources: InternationalFinancial Statistics (IMF),World Bank Project(Pfeffennannand
Madarassy, 1991),Summers-Heston(1988).
Definitions: All policy variables are standard deviations of the residual based on a first-order
autoregressiveprocess.gov=ratioofgovernment consumption expenditure to GDP; ggov=
growth in the ratio of government consumptionexpendituresto GDP ipub= ratio of public
investment to GDP def= ratio ofgovernmentbudget deficittoGDP rev= ratio of government
revenuestoGDP; do growth in domestic credit; mo= growth in money; in=inflation tate.
Counuies:Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,Colombia, Ecuador,Guyana,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,ElSalvador, Guatemala,
Haiti. Honduras, Jamaica,Mexico,Nicaragua, Panama. Azia: Bangladesh, Hong Kong. India
Korea(S.),Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore,Sri Lanka,Taiwan, Thailand.
Africa: Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya. Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zimbabwe.
ImaI: LatinAmerica,Asia, Africa, plus Oceania (Fiji, Indonesia, Papau New Guinea) and
Turkey.
Note: Some correlationscalculatedfor a sample of less than 46 developing counuies due to data
limitations.4
On the fiscal side, selected policies include the share of government
consumption expenditure (gov) and the share of public investment (ipub) in GDP.
Since there is no reason to believe that uncertainty about policy levels matters
more than uncertainty about policy growth rates (although uncertainty about one
implies uncertainty about the other), we also look at uncertainty surrounding the
growth in the share of government consumption expenditures (ggov). Additional
fiscal variables are government revenues (rev) and the government budget deficit
(defl, both scaled by GDP. Our rationale for scaling fiscal policy variables is to
make the standard deviation measure unit free and thus acceptable for cross-
country comparisons. Our choice of fiscal variables is not meant to. be all-
inclusive. Indeed, we could have added measures of real government spending or
tax revenues in levels, converted into index form.
On the monetary side, we focus on the unexpected parts of domestic credit
expansion (do) and of money growth (mo). Though not a policy instrument, we
also consider ikiflation surprises (in), since they might capture uncertainty in the
underlying policy stance and have been studied before.2
log(Po1icy) =ao + ai(iime)+
and taking the standard deviation of the residual.IngeneraJ, the results were qualitatively the same
and are not reported.
2For example, Fischer (1991) examines the relation between growthandthe inflation rate and
C3regorio (1991) looks at the relation between growth and inflation variance. Note that these
measures include the certain component of inflation as well as the uncertain component Edwards
and Tabeffini (1990) examine the relationship between inflation and political instability.5
Table 1 shows that the negative correlation between policyuncertainty and
growth is strongest for some of the fiscal measures, namely gov (-0.387),ggov
(-0.338)and ipub (-0.312). Thecorrelation between budget deficit surprises and
growth is -0.27 while the correlation between unexpectedgovernment revenues
andgrowth is a weak -0.15. The correlations between money surprises and
growth range between -0.285 (do) and -0.265 (mo).
The summary correlations disguise much cross-regional variation. Figure
2 compares the correlations between policy uncertainty measures and growth
rates for Latin America and Asia, while Figure 3 does the same for Africa and
Asia. Points clustered along the 450 line indicate that the correlations between
policy uncertainty measures and growth are similar across regions.
Figure 2 reveals that the correlations for Latin America and Asia are quite
dissimilar. The unexpected component of government expenditures relative to
GD!' is negatively associated with growth in both Latin America and Asia, but the
correlation is doubly strong in Asia. Unexpected components of other fiscal
variables are negatively correlated with growth in Latin America but positively
correlated with growth in Asia. The correlations betweenmoney surprises and
growth are also negative in Latin America but positive in Asia.
Figure 3 shows greater similarities in the correlations for Asian and
African countries. For example, both regions show astrong negative relation
between government expenditure surprises and growth. Both show a positive
relation between government revenue surprises and growth and between


























































































































































































































































































































































correlations between money surprises and growth differ in sign for the two
regions: the correlations are positive for Asia but negative for Africa.3
Figure 4 plots simple correlations between growth and policy uncertainty
measures where the sample of developing countries is separated by growth
performance rather than by region. For the sample of low-growth countries,
there is a negative correlation between growth and all policy uncertainty
measures while for the high-growth countries, some correlations are negative but
others are positive. The results are sensitive to the countries included, however.
When correlations are compared for the top third and bottom third of the sample
in terms of growth performance, the results were more mixed.
Table 2 illustrates regional disparities in the amount of policy uncertainty,
as measured by the standard deviations of the residuals. As one might surmise,
money surprises are much bigger in Latin America than either Asia or Africa.
When outliers Argentina and Bolivia are eliminated, money surprises are still
twice as large as those in Asia. Fiscal surprises are more comparable across
regions, especially deficit and revenue surprises. Surprises in the share of
government expenditures and public investment expenditures are somewhat
larger for Latin America than for Asia, but public investment surprises are most
pronounced in Africa.
We next turn to cross-sectional regressions in order to check whether the
correlation between growth and policy uncertainty continues to hold once
additional variables are taken into account. The dependent variable in the
3 Following the same procedure,we can also compare correlations for African and Latin American
countries. The comparison yieldsmarkeddifferences. For example the correlation between













































































































































































































































StandardDeviation of Policy Surprises
Variable L Am Mica
gov 1.557 1.822 1.163 1.624
ggov 9.936 11.079 9.541 9.056
ipub 1.529 1.577 1.228 2.050
def 1.917 1.963 1.723 2.340
rev 1.643 1.758 1.490 1.620
do 25.925 38.556 12.991 14.345
mo 26.744 42.923 9.034 14.912
in 25.217 42.51 7.821 6.04
Data Sources: International Financial Statistics (IMF), World Bank Project (Pfeffermann and
Madarassy, 1991). Summers-Heston (1988).7
regressionsis percapita realGDP growth over the period 1970-85 (CR7085).
For regressors, we follow endogenous growth theory and the work of Barro
(1991) andothersby including both the initial level of percapita income
(GDP7O) and a human capital variable. The human capital variable is the U.N.
measure of the number of students enrolled in primary grades in 1970 relative to
the total population of six to eleven year olds (PRIM7O). Although technically a
flow variable, it is used to proxy the stock of human capital over the period.4
Two additional regressors are included in the basic regression. One is
lagged growth (CR6570) and the other is the uncertain component of policy as
measured by the standard deviation of the residual over the sample period
(POLICY). Physical investment is not included as an explanatory variable
because of its likely endogeneity. However, the lagged growth variable probably
captures effects of past investment. The basic regression is thus of the form:
(2) CR7085 =u)+ aiGDP7O + cz2PRIM7O + a3GR6570 + U4POLICY + Ct
We also experimented with modified versions of the basic regression by
adding dummies for Latin America and Africa. These dummies were entered
both as constants and as slope dummies on the policy surprise variable. Table 3
4 See Barro (1991) for a detailed explanation of this variable and its relation to growth. Another
human capital variable, secondary school enrollments, was initially included but was dropped
because it proved to be insignificant. Barro gets a significant positive coefficient on secondary
school enrollments, but his sample of countries includes the OECD countries. Fischer (1991)
worked with a smaller sample of developed and developing countries and did not find secondary
school enrollments to be significant.8
displaysonly the basic regressions, which do not include the dummies. Because
heterskedasticitycould be important across developing countries, the standard
errors for the coefficients are based on \Vhite's (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix.5
The results in Table 3 show that policy uncertainty enters the basic
regression as highly significant and negative in the majority of cases. The
coefficients on the other variables are also highly significant and have the
expected signs.
The problem with equation (2) is that the policy surprise variable is a
constructed variable measured with error. Because the measurement error
appears in both the policy surprise variable andthedisturbance term, the policy
variable will be contemporaneously correlated with the disturbanceterm,
violating one of the assumptions of ordinary least squares. The parameter
estimate on the policy surprise variable is biased downwards and the standard
error is also biased, although the direction of bias is difficult to evaluate.6
In an attempt to get around this problem, instrumental variable estimation
of (2) was undertaken. A number of instrumentswere tried. We tested the
frequency of coups, revolutions and assassinations, terms-of-trade variance,
5 It turns outthatthese standard enors an close to those obtained by ordinary leastsquares.
6 If theerror in thepolicy surprise variable is uncorrelated withthe other regressors,whichseems
tobe true in our case, parameter estimates on thoseregressors will be consistent. If two or more
regressors are measured with error, then their parameter estimates will be inconsistent and the
direction of bias difficult to determine. The problem ofmeasurement error in developing country












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































measures of market distortions, inflation variance, and various grouping
methods, but typically the instruments were not highly correlated with the policy
urprise variable. Consequently, the instrumental variable estimator was not
significant in the regression. We ended up using the level of policy and the
variance of policy as instruments for each of the policy surprise variables. The
regressions results are reported in Table 4. We will focus on Table 4 for the
remainder of this section.
Equation (1) says that a one percent increase in the standard deviation of
the residual of government consumption relative to GDP lowers growth by about
1 percent per year. The other variables have the expected signs and are
significant at the 95% confidence interval. Growth over the 1970-85 period is
positively related to past growth performance and to primary school enrollments
and negatively related to the initial level of percapita realGDP. When we
examine the regressions that include regional dummies, we find that uncertainty
about the share of government consumption has a much smaller negative effect
on growth in Latin America than in Asia or Africa.
Equations (2)-(5) show the correlation between growth and other fiscal
surprises. Unexpected changes in the growth of government consumption
expenditures have a negative effect on growth in the basic regression. However,
when regional dummies are included, their significance disappears. Unexpected
changes in government deficits do not appear to have any bearing on growth
except in Africa. Unexpected movements in government revenues have a positive
effect on growth, although the positive correlation is much less pronounced in
Latin America.
According to equation (3), unexpected movements in the share of public










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































regional dummies modifies the outcome. Now uncertainty about public
investment expenditures is positively correlated with growth in Asia and Africa
but negatively correlated in Latin America.
Turning to regressions (6) and (7), which incorporate monetary policies,
we find that surprises in domestic credit or money growth rates are negatively
correlated with growth. However,when regional dummies are included, the
correlations between monetary surprises and growth are no longer significant.
In summary, the regressions are highly suggestive. After taking into
account schooling, lagged growth and the starting level of per capita real GDP,
uncertainty about some government policies is still strongly correlated with
growth. The correlations are typically negative, but not always. It would be nice
to have a story that explains how policy uncertainty might affect long-run
growth, why policy uncertainty is often negatively correlated with growth but
sometimes positively correlated, and why policy uncertainty does not always
matter for growth. We now turn to the development of a framework that can
address these issues.
Ill. The Model
In this section, we construct a general equilibrium endogenous growth
model in order to highlight channels that link policy uncertainty and growth. We
focus on the irreversible investment channel.7 A novel aspect of our approach is
7 Important contributions to the literature on irreversible investment include the papers by
Bemanke (1983), McDonald and Siegel (1985), and Pindyck(1988). For irreversibleinvestment
and development policies see Rodrik (1989) and Aizenman (1990). On endogenous growth see
Uzawa (1965), Lucas (1988), Romer (1986), Krugman (1987) and Kohn and Marion (1988).11
identifyingthe roteof policy persistence. We show that irreversible investment
perse does notsuffice toexplaintheeffectof policy uncertainty on growth.
Rather, it is the interaction between investment irreversibilities andpolicy
persistence that accounts for this effect.
The policy instrument we model is a tax on capital.Policy uncertainty
arises because the size of the tax is unknown at the time that investmentdecisions
are made. Endogenous growth comes about because knowledge is one input in the
production process. In the model, policy uncertainty affects growth only through
the supply side of the economy. That is because thesimple utility function we
adopt insulates savers from the effects of policy uncertainty. Obviously,some of
the effects of policy uncertainty on growthmay stem from the saving side. In the
appendix we provide an example where policy uncertainty affectssaving and
growth.
We start the discussion with a model of irreversibleinvestment that
highlights the role of policy persistence. We then embody this model ina general
equilibrium endogenous growth framework, where investment in humanand
physical capital are linked. We use the growth model to illustratethe
consequences of policy uncertainty on growth.
111.1Investment determination and growth
Consider the case where there is 'one sidedtmobility of capital: domestic
agents have an outside option that offers a safe yield, but due tocountry risk
considerations, all domestic investment must bedomestically financed. This
assumption captures the position of a developingcountry that for reasons such as
debt overhang cannot borrow in the internationalcapital market but also
experiences capital flight. The international risk free interestrate is p. Firms are12
competitive and risk neutral, hiring labor to the point where the marginal
product of labor equals the wage, and investing in capital to the point that
maximizes the net present values of expected profits.
Suppose that there are two possible tax regimes, characterized by a high or
low profit tax. We denote the two regimes by hand1,respectively.The tax is
imposed at the beginning of each period, and it may be either high or low (at




where0 ￿ xe. The probability of sustaining the present regime for the next
period is denoted by $, where0 c $c1, and is assumed to be the same for both
regimes.8 In such an economy, the uncertainty is measured by the policy gap
between the two regimes, 2 c, and the probability of switching regimes, 1- 4.
Theprocess specified in equation (3) generates a Markov chain, where the
behavior of the tax rate next period depends on the present tax regime, but is
independent of past history. An important characteristic of this tax policy is that
the relevance of the present regime for the nature of future regimes declines
geometrically over time, at a rate determined by the persistence of the tax
regime. Each time we enter a regime, the evolution of the future is independent
of the past This implies that as long as the probability of reaching each regime is
8 The keyresultshold even if$ differs across regimes (see Appendix A).13
positive, the long-mn stochastic properties are independent of the initial
conditions. In Appendix A we show that the asymptotic probability of the
occurrence of a given regime is one-half and is independent of the nature of the
initial regime. The asymptotic variance of the tax rate is determined by the
policy gap, and is given by 2, whereas the asymptotic expected tax rate is xo
Theasymptotic autocorrelation of taxes is 2 $- 1.We will use 2-Ias a
measure of persistence: a zero value (obtained for 4= .5)corresponds to the
absence of persistence.
While in the long-mn the variance of taxes is determined only by the tax
gap between the two regimes, in the short-run the behavior of the economy is
more involved. Both the expected fiuure tax and the variance of future taxes may
differ across tax regimes. Our analysis will show that a key factor determining
the short-mn difference in investment under the two regimes is the persistence of
the present tax regime. In the absence of regime persistence, the bets regarding
the future tax rate are symmetric. This implies that the expected future tax rate is
independent of the policy gap: a higher policy gap will increase taxes in the h
regime,and will reduce taxes in the Iregime.The symmetric bet structure
implies a zero net effect of these changes on the expected future tax rate. In the
presence of persistence, the bets regarding the future regime are asymmetric,
implying that the expected future tax rate depends on the policygap. For
example, if the probability of a high tax regime next period exceeds one-half, a
higher policy gap will increase the expected tax rate. The asymmetric bet
structure is determined by the persistence of regimes, which together with the
policy gap determine the linkage between policy uncertainty and investment. We
turn now to the derivation of these results.14
Suppose that profits depend linearly on the stock of capital, such that gross
profits are given by
(4)7tKt
where Kt is the capital stock. Thus, the marginal product of capital (net of
taxes) is given by it(l- ).Domesticagents can save abroad, obtaining a risk free
interest rate of p. We denote the expected net present value of the marginal
product of capital (discounted at the risk free outside yield p) by V ,wherei=
h, I standfor a high and a low tax, respectively. The values of V are obtained by
solving the following conditions:
tEA (1- Xh )+Vh + (1-)[it(1- x )÷V1I









(8) V1 =it + £ 2(1-t)+p
Theinvestment rule for a risk neutral entrepreneur is to invest if the
expected net present value of the marginal product of capital is at least one, the
cost of capital. If that value falls short of one, no new investment will occur. If it
exceeds one, then the investment will be financed by domestic savings. (Recall
that due to country risk considerations external lenders am not willing to invest.)15
Figure 5summarizesthe factors determining the values of V by plotting
Vi, and Vj as a function of 4.Notethat in the absence of a tax gap between
regimes (i.e., c =0),V =V0.With policy uncertainty, the values of V are
determined by the product of half the tax gap, a, and the persistence of the policy
regime, 24—1 .If4> $ wewill observe new investment in the state of low
taxes, where V =Viand no investment in the state with high taxes. This situation
is depicted in Figure 5, where for 4= +oPoints L and H correspond to the states
of low and high taxes, respectively. If 4c wewill observe investment in the
state with high taxes. In the absence of persistence (4 = .5),a higher policy gap
will not affect the pattern of investment. This leads us to conclude that policy
uncertainty affects investment through the interaction of persistence and the
policy gap. With persistence, a higher policy gap will increase the expected
marginal productivity of capital in the low-tax regime, and will reduce the
expected marginal product of capital in the high-tax regime. This suggests that
higher policy uncertainty, as manifested in a higher a, will work to increase
investment in the! regime and depress it in the hregime.Of course, if regime
switches are highly probable, then the opposite results will occur. Consequently,
increases in the component of policy uncertainty measured by C can lead to a
variety of outcomes, depending on the degree of policy persistence.9
9We lookedfor evidenceof persistence in the annual data on macro policies adopted by our
sample ofdeveloping counuies. Assuming thateach policy follows a first-order autoregressive
process, we first checkedthecoefficientonthe lagged policy variable.Figure 6 illustratesthe
outcome for one fiscal measure. For all fiscal policies considered in the study, at least two-thirds
of the countries showed a coefficient on the lagged policy variable between 0.5 and 1.0, providing
onepiece of evidenceofpersistence. For moneygrowth rates, persistencewas less pronounced.V
— =V0
iSa




























Consider a case where policy is characterized by persistence.
Specifically, suppose that $>$,and CI<V1. In such a case investment
occurs only at state I. Competition among entrepreneurs will imply that in state!
they will be willing to offer an interest rate r1 , determined by the conditions that:
4[it (I- Xh )"h+(I-)[ic(1- Xj ) I —= Vh





whereVisthe expected net present value of the marginal product of capital with
an endogenously determined domestic interest rate. Applying (9)-(l 1) we infer
a r1
that the interest rate depends positively on c, wherea
—
Assumingthat external lenders are not willing to invest, the domestic stock of
capital will be determined by domestic savings, according to the rule:
We also tried aDickey-Fullertest tosee whether we could reject the hypothesis that policy is
characterizedby a unit root. Keeping in mind that the power of the test is weak given thesmall
samplesize of fifteen annual observations, the test showed thatonly in rareinstances could we
reject the hypothesis that fiscal policiesfollowa random walk. We rejected the hypothesisof a




where i= h or1,accordingto the realization of uncertainty. The equilibrium in
the loan market is summarized in Figure 7.Supposethat the saving function has
an inverted L shape given by SS (an example for such a case is given in the next
section). In the hstatethe demand for investment is I Lh ,thedomestic interest
rate is p ,andno new investment occurs. In the Istatecurve I Ii is the demand
for investment, and the domestic interest rate is r1.
Our discussion here can be extended to allow for the presence of an
upward sloping saving function. Such an extension will have two implications.
First, the investment effects described above will operate in a continuous manner.
Second, some of the effects of uncertainty will occur via the saving side. As is
well known, the impact of uncertainty on saving is ambiguous (see Sandmo
(1970)). Appendix B provides an example where policy uncertainty dampens
savings, investment and growth.
We turn now to a description of an endogenous growth model, which will
be used to illustrate the relevance of policy uncertainty for growth. We review
preferences, output, investment in human capital, factor markets equilibrium and
the intertemporal equilibrium. We use the growth model to illustrate the
consequences of policy uncertainty on growth.
111.2. Preferences
The representative individual born at time t lives for two periods. He







Investment, Saving, and Policy Uncertainty
FIGURE 718
earning a real wage of wt. The aggregate labor force is normalized to one. We
assumea simpleadditive utility,
(13) Ut =Ci;t+ iC2;1,
whereC1;tand C2.t+i are the consumption in the first and second period of
life by a consumer born at date t. The individual born at time t must decide how
to allocate his labor income (wamong investment in human capital,
consumption at time t and saving.
111.3. Output
Outputat timet isgiven by
(14)X= A[Kt](3[Ht L]lP O￿
Here K. and L1 are, respectively, the capital stock, the know-how and the
laboremployed.
111.4. Investmentin humancapital
Ina moreextendedmodel, one could consider a three period horizon for a
representative agent. In the first period theagentinvests in human capital, in the
second period he works, and in the third period he retires. For expositional
simplicity, we collapse both investment in human capital and work into the first
period. A young person works and may use pan of his income to invest in19
human capital in order to improve his productivity. The labor forceemployed at
time t is given by L.
The stock of 'knowledge" (HI equals the accumulatedstock of past
investment in human capital plus any contemporaneous investment. Weassume
that a worker of generation t is endowed with an inherited know-howof Hti. A
worker's investment of 1 will increase the knowledgeaccording to:
11
(15)Ht -Hi=h1t' h>0.
The parameter h measures the effectiveness of investment in humancapital in
enhancing know-how (h output units are translated to one unit of H).10 Note that
in this set up the worker is unable to appropriate all the benefits of hisinvestment
in human capital. Consequently the equilibrium will besuboptimal since this
positive externality is not taken into account when making the investment
decision.
111.5.Factor markets equilibrium
The employment of labor is governed by the condition that
10Weassume theabsence of depreciation,andthat investment in human capital is done by
workers.Modifying theseassumptions will notaffect thekey results.20
(16)
Lt
The investment in human capital is determined so as to maximize labor income,






The solution to this problem yields the following levels for human capital and





The wage w is determined so as to clear the aggregate labor market. Applying
(14), (16) and (18) we infer that
(20) X= a wherea =AUP[(Ip)2Th]0P)&
Recall that the aggregate supplyof labor is one. Weassume that workers coordinate their
human investment decisions, such that each worker pays a fraction of the total cost, proponional to
his share (given by LnJl).21
The parameter a depends positively on the productivity of direct inputs
(measured by A) and the productivity of the investment in human capital
(measured by I/h).
111.6. Investment determination and growth in the absence of risk
Investment is undertaken by entrepreneurs ,whooffer interest rate r to
the savers, and use these savings to invest in productive capital. In the absence of
uncertainty, the solution of the consumer's problem is trivial: save all in the first
period if the interest rate exceeds the subjective rate of time preference1 2•
Recalling that investment in human capital is financed out of wage income, the
equilibrium condition in the loan market requires the equality of investment in
physical capital and saving:
(21) K+i -K =St-Kt
Aggregate investment in period t appears on the LHS of (21). Aggregate
saving is specified on the RHS of (21). It corresponds to the saving of the young
minus the dissaving of the old, who sell the past capital stock to the young.
Assuming that the interest rate exceeds the rate of time preference, we conclude
that
12 This assumption is equivalentto the requirement that the marginalproductivity of capita! (a,
definedin (20)) exceeds p.This is equivalent to the assumption that
I3[(l.I3)2/hI(P)43 (A)1 > p.22
(22) Kt+i =iw+(l-Pitj
Applying (16) to (22) and recalling that the labor force is normalized to one, we
get that:
(20') =a(1-p)[13 X+ (143) X11
A sufficient condition for endogenous growth is that a (143) >1,or that the
efficiency coefficient A be high enough (Formally, we need A > h1$/(l-
13)(213b13
Suppose now that entrepreneurs are facing uncertainty due to a stochastic
profits tax, of the type described in section 111.1 .Allthe results described in
equations (3) -(12)hold for the present framework, where it =3a.Insuch an
environment, if the expected marginal productivity of capital is high enough, the
entrepreneur will offer an interest rate equal at least to p, and will use all
domestic savings to finance investment. In that case, the behavior of the economy
will resemble equations (20)-(22). If the expected marginal productivity at period
is low enough, entrepreneurs will not be able to offer a high enough interest
rate to compete with the safe alternative. In that case domestic savings will be
channeled abroad, and the evolution of the stock of capital next period will be
13 Note that if only a fraction s of the ONP is saved, the evolution of the ON? is determined by
=sa(l-)[ X+ (1-13) X 1'
A lower saving rate will reduce growth.23
determined by K+i =Kt
.Notethat in such a case, no new investment in
human capital will occur in period H-i, w = and there is no growth.'4
IV. Concluding remarks
We have presented evidence of a correlation between policy uncertainty and
growth, although the importance of this correlation and even its sign depend on
the particular policy and on the geographical region examined. In our theoretical
model, we have shown that if policy uncertainty as measured by the gap between
policy regimes is small, it will have a limited effect on growth. If instead the
policy gap is large, uncertainty will have a more pronounced effect on growth
unless the probability of a policy switch is exactly one-half. The evidence suggests
that macro policies are persistent. If policy is persistent, then increased policy
uncertainty will stimulate growth if the country is currently in a low-tax regime
but depress it if the country is currently in a high-tax regime. Alternatively, if
the probability of a regime switch is high, the opposite results will occur. The
point is that policy uncertainty can lead to different outcomes. Policy uncertainty
in the absence of persistence does not affect long run growth. It is the interaction
of the gap between policies and the persistence of policy regimes that alters the
pattern of investment and growth.
14Applying (14), (16) and (18) we can infer that Ht = Kt[A(l-I3)2/hJ'.Thus, K1j =Kt
implies that Ht+1 =Ht.24
Appendix A
Asymptotic Behavior
The purpose of this Appendix is to describe the asymptotic behavior of the
tax rates defined in (3). Let denote the probability of observing a tax
regime i at period t+n if the tax regime at period t is j(fori ,j h,I
From definitions it follows that
I h I h (Al) t+n;j -Ri-n;j
=(2t-i-n-i;j -1I+ni;j]
Iterating (Al) backward n-i times we get that
h I n-Il h (A2) t+n;j -R+n;j
=(2-1) -
Itfollows that, as long as 0< <1. for n —,co+n;j
-t-n;j-4 0.
Note that + p =I.Thus, the asymptotic probability of the
occurrence of each regime is half, independently from the nature of the initial
regime. The symmetric nature of the two regimes in the long run is the outcome
of our assumption that the probability of a regime switch is independent from the
nature of the regime. Applying the same methodology it can be shown that if the
probability of sustaining regime i is $, thenthe asymptotic probability of the
occurrence of regime i is U -ø)/(2 - 4i-
øj)25
for i, j E ( hi ), Ij The key results of our discussion can be extended to
this case.
Suppose that we observe at time t regime j. The expected value and the
variance of taxes at period H-n,denoted by E(Xt+n;j)and VAR(xt+.j).are
givenby:
E(Xt+n;j) = :+n;j x +
2j 2
and VAR(Xt+n;j) = t+n; - E(Xt+n.j)) + t+n;j (x j - ECç÷.jfl
for ij.
The asymptotic expected tax rate and the asymptotic variance are the limits of
VAR(Xt+n;j)
and for a —* o0 Applying the fact that the asymptotic
probability of each regime is half it follows that
E(Xt+n;j)
—* ; and V(Xt+n;j) independentlyfrom the initialregime.












ft 1 - E(Xt+n;j)}(l- h- E(;+n+i.j)J]+
Pt+n;j[(Xh- E(Xt+n;j)}$(Xh- E(Xt+n+l;j)}+26
(X h- E(Xt+n;jfl(l-t){x-
Applyingthe fact that the asymptotic probability of each regime is half, and that
E4:)ç+;j) —,x , ifollows that for n —+
E[(xt+.E(xt+fl.j)}{xt+fl+l -E(x++1.)]—*(24-I)e2.27
Appendix B
Uncertainty and Growth: The Case of a Saving Tax
The purpose of this Appendix is to provide an example of an economy
where the linkage between policy uncertainty and growth is generated via the
saving side. Suppose consumer preferences are given by a constant absolute risk
aversion utility: 15
(Bi) U =-exp-t(1+p){Ci;t+ 1
A useful feature of the utility function specified in (B!) is the separation of the
degree of risk aversion from the degree of intertemporal substitutability. This is
done at the cost of forgoing the linearity advantage. If entrepreneurs are risk
neutral, then they will offer the consumer a risk free yield, and utility (B 1) will
be reduced to the full information case, which is equivalent to (13). To generate
an example where saving behavior is the source of the adverse effects of policy
uncertainty, we consider an economy where the source of the uncertainty is a
15In theabsence of uncertaintythe utility specified in our paper is equivalenttotime additively
separable preferences, where the subjective discount factor is p. With uncertainty, the degree of
risk aversion is measured by t.28
stochastic tax on saving instead of on investment.'6 The saving tax, x ,behaves
according to:17
(B2) x -N(,4).
Theconsumption is given by:
(B3) Ci;t= Itj
-S C2;t =(1+r)(I_ x+i)S
where N denotes income and the interest rate is given by r The consumer
chooses saving so as to maximize his expected utility, yielding
(I +r)(I -x)-(1+p)
(B4)St =Min( 2 ,INI
(1+r)2ta
Thebehavior of the saving function is plotted in Figure 8. In the absence of
uncertainty, the saving schedule has an inverted L shape: saving is elastic at an
interest rate that guarantees an after-tax yield equal to the rate of time preference
up to the income ceiling (see schedule SSO). In the presence of uncertainty we
observe a saving function like S Higher uncertainty, manifested as higher
16We assume that due to the absence of a sophisticated domestic capital market this risk is
u ni nsurable.
17 The assumption that the tax rate follows a normal disiribution is taken to simplify the analysis.
It implies that one can not place bounds on the realized tax. A way to overcome this problem is to
assume that the tax rate follows a symmetric truncated normal distribution. It can be shown that our















variance of the expected income, will shift the saving schedule to the left. Ifthe
demand for credit to finance investment is depicted by curve II, domesticsaving
is determined by the intersection of the saving schedule and the IIcurve. As is
evident from our analysis, higher uncertainty will reduce investment.30
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